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THE EAST ASIAN MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Jong H. Park*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the debate on the East Asian model of economic development in light
of the different approaches undertaken by different groups of countries (economies) in
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The common strengths and weaknesses shared by the
East Asian countries (economies) have helped to reinforce the misconception that there is
a single East Asian model of economic development. There are, however, significant differences in economic structures as well as development experiences among the East Asian
economies, especially between the economic development paradigms of Southeast Asia
and Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, one single common thread underlies the differences in
development strategies and experiences among the East Asian economies—the role of the
government. The governments of East Asia have recognized the limitations of markets (or
market failures) in the allocation of scarce resources in the economy, and have used government interventions to promote economic development. The recent Asian crisis hardly
signifies the end of the so-called East Asian model of economic development.

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Asian financial crisis has raised a series of questions about the efficacy and sustainability of the so-called East Asian model of economic development.
Many have questioned whether the model could be considered valid for other
developing countries to follow in pursuit of economic development. In fact, some
have suggested that the Asian crisis not only signifies “the end of the Asian miracle,” but also signals the failure of the East Asian model.
The debate on the validity of the model is not that simple, however. For
instance, South Korea and Taiwan are known to have followed the model for their
successful economic development efforts. This model of state-directed capitalism
seemed to combine the dynamic aspects of a market-oriented economy with the
advantages of centralized government planning and direction. The model has been
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credited for transforming East Asian countries into an export powerhouse and for
producing spectacular economic growth. While South Korea, along with other
Southeast Asian countries, was hard hit by the crisis of 1997 to 1998, Taiwan has
not only avoided the Asian financial contagion, but has also continued to grow at
a respectable rate. Is the model itself in crisis or are there other explanations for
the varying outcomes of the East Asian model as followed by South Korea,
Taiwan, and other Southeast Asian countries? The common economic success as
well as the common financial crisis in recent years has led many to presume the
existence of a single model of economic development for the economies in East
Asia. This is implicit in most of discussions concerning the underlying reasons for
the economic rise and fall of East Asia.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the debate on the East Asian
model of economic development in light of the different approaches undertaken
by different groups of countries (economies) in Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia. The paper is organized as follows. We first review, in Section II, some of the
common elements that are believed to be responsible for the Asian financial crisis, which has opened the debate on the East Asian model for development.
Section III examines the old paradigms for development—one emphasizing markets and the other government planning—before discussing the common elements
responsible for the rise of the East Asian economies. In Section IV we argue that
there is no such thing as a single East Asian model of economic development.
Even South Korea and Taiwan, two prime examples of the stylized East Asian
model of development, have employed different developmental strategies, resulting in different outcomes. Section V examines some of the similarities as well as
differences in development strategies across the economies in Northeast Asia and
those in Southeast Asia. The similarities and differences will be noted in terms of
the role of government and industrial policy, attitudes, and policies towards FDI
and technology transfer, and policies for export-led growth. Section VI concludes
the paper with a discussion of the applicability of East Asia’s development experiences to other developing countries.
II. EAST ASIA: FROM “MIRACLE” TO CRISIS1
Great Reversal of Capital Flows
Outstanding economic performance of the East Asian economies in the late 1980s
and the early 1990s attracted a surge in private capital inflows into these emerging economies. That surge in capital inflows helped fuel the increase in the bank
credit-financed investment boom. According to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), the total net private capital flows into the Asian emerging markets during 1994 to 1996 amounted to a whopping $184 billion. In 1996 alone,
there was a record capital inflow of $93 billion into Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Korea (hereafter called the Asian 5). But the following year,
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1997, saw a net outflow of $12 billion. This amounted to a reversal of $105 billion, equivalent to 11 percent of the combined GDP of the Asian 5. This was the
greatest reversal of private capital flows ever recorded in the world economy, and
represents “the most significant geo-financial adjustment to date in the relatively
new era of globally integrated capital markets” (Makin 1999:408). It was this
reversal of capital flows that precipitated the Asian currency crisis, eventually
pushing “miracle” economies into a dramatic financial meltdown with serious
economic, social, and political consequences.
The East Asian Meltdown: Some Common Elements
The reversal of foreign capital, combined with the flight of domestic funds,
caused massive depreciation of the Asian 5’s currencies: the Indonesian rupiah by
75 percent, the Malaysian ringgit and the Philippines peso by 40 percent, and the
Thai baht and Korean won by almost 50 percent. These crashes in currency were
soon followed by dramatic falls in the stock market in these countries as well as
in Hong Kong and Singapore, eventually leading these “miracle economies” into
the “Asian meltdown.” Government officials, business executives, and academicians pondered what went wrong in East and Southeast Asia. The miracle
economies in the region were contracting much faster than anyone had anticipated. Hundreds and thousands of business firms went bankrupt, including some big
chaebols in Korea. Unemployment soared in a country where lifetime employment was a norm. How could this happen to the miracle economies? Does this
mean the end of the East Asian miracle?
The seeds of the 1997 to 1998 Asian financial crisis were sown during the
previous decades when East and Southeast Asian countries were experiencing
unprecedented economic growth, which has transformed their economies.
Although there have been and remain important differences between individual
countries, the Asian 5 shared a number of common elements, all contributing
directly or indirectly to the crisis. They include a credit-fueled investment boom,
a weak and unsound banking sector and financial system, a pegged exchange rate
regime, current account deficits, and loss in investor confidence.
Credit-Fueled Investment Boom
During the 1990s, GDP growth in the region exceeded 5 percent per annum and
often was closer to 10 percent. Such strong economic growth, and the expectation
that the growth would continue, led to an enormous increase in investment. The
investment shares in GDP in most Asian countries increased substantially between
1988 and 1996. Between 1990 and 1996, for instance, gross domestic investment
grew by over 16 percent per year in Indonesia, 16 percent in Malaysia, 15.3 percent in Thailand, and 7.2 percent in Korea, while investment grew only by 4.1 percent in the U.S. and by .8 percent in all other high-income countries (World Bank
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1997, table 11). Much of this unprecedented growth in investment in these Asian
countries was financed by bank credit, and was concentrated either in areas with
highly volatile returns, such as stocks and real estate, or in areas where substantial capacity already existed, thus leading to over-expansion and excess capacity.
Inefficient Bank-Centered Financial Systems
One of the elements shared by the Asian 5 has been the weakness of their bankcentered financial systems. The banks in these countries simply failed to develop
appropriate procedures for evaluating risks when extending loans. There was
little incentive to develop such procedures because the bank managers were subject to direction by the government authorities, and they expected the government
to support their borrowers. The government-directed, discretionary policy of credit allocation for rapid economic growth may have achieved its goal, but the financial institutions, including commercial banks, became simply a “silent partner” in
the process of economic development. Financial repression, characteristic of the
East Asian model for development, has been responsible for the unsound, weak,
and inefficient financial systems in these countries. The surveillance of bank
operations was lacking, and prudent regulation of the banking system was lax,
resulting in inadequate bank capital relative to the risky bank loans. In addition,
banks did not have adequate capacity for project evaluation in lending practices,
especially in the aftermath of increased financial liberalization in these countries.
As a result, when economic conditions abruptly worsened, the quality of the bank
assets deteriorated quickly, producing non-performing loans.
Exchange Rate Misalignment
Mainly as a way of inducing foreign capital, all of the Asian 5 currencies had, in
one way or another, been aligned with or pegged to the U.S. dollar or a basket of
currencies dominated by the U.S. dollar. This linking of the official exchange rates
to the U.S. dollar had one major drawback. As the value of the dollar changed, so
did the exchange value of these currencies relative to other currencies that are not
tied to the dollar such as the Japanese yen and the German mark.
The impact of the exchange rate misalignment can be traced back to the
Plaza Accord of 1985. As the Japanese yen began its rapid appreciation against
other currencies, particularly the U.S. dollar, the relative costs of production rose
in Japan. In response, Japanese firms shifted their production activities overseas,
mainly to Korea and Taiwan. To counteract the blow of this outward FDI to the
domestic economy, the Japanese government used aggressive monetary expansion. This created giant asset bubbles in Japan and massive capital outflows into
Korea and Taiwan. By the late 1980s, these two countries came under similar
pressures as a result of the appreciation of the Korean won and the Taiwanese
dollar. To combat these pressures so as to maintain the exchange value of their
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currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar, they relied on aggressive monetary expansion. The results were asset price bubbles at home and large capital outflows, this
time primarily to Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Indonesia.
The seeds of the financial turmoil were sown in the mid-1990s when the
U.S. dollar started to appreciate against other currencies, especially the Japanese
yen. The Asian currencies tied to the dollar rose in value and made their exports
more expensive to non-dollar buyers and their imports from non-dollar areas
cheaper. The weakening yen drastically reduced the export competitiveness of the
Asian 5 vis-à-vis that of Japan. The result was to increase the current account
deficits for the Asian 5. Downward pressures created by the increased current
account deficits necessitated increased government intervention to maintain the
exchange value of their currencies, depleting their foreign exchange reserves; all
of this, in addition to the adverse impact of the devaluation of the Chinese renminbi yuan in 1994.
Coincidence and Compounding
Considered separately, none of the elements that are usually put forward as contributing factors are enough to explain the source and extent of the Asian crisis.
The interaction of these elements produced a conjuncture of problems, compounding the vulnerability of these economies to external shocks. Thus, Grenville
(1998:13) sums up the story of the Asian meltdown:
Large capital inflows led, more-or-less inevitably, to excessive credit growth and
growth of the financial sector, because it was not possible to sterilise them fully.
The large flows meant, also, that there was easy funding available for projects
(both good and bad), and that asset prices were bid up. Similarly, the large capital flows made it difficult to raise interest rates higher (they were already quite
high), for fear of inducing even more capital inflow. High domestic interest rates,
at the same time, persuaded many borrowers to take the risk of tapping into
attractively lower foreign currency-denominated borrowing. Further, with quasifixed exchange rate regimes in these countries, there was little incentive for institutions borrowing in foreign currencies to hedge their debt. These issues should
have been recognised as sources of vulnerability, but the focus was on growth,
without enough concern about resilience in the face of variance in growth.

The crucial combination was the large, volatile, foreign capital flows and
the fragile financial systems. These two elements, in combination, made the Asian
emerging market economies extremely vulnerable to changes in investor confidence. Financial markets are supposed to constantly digest and evaluate information to produce a price, an exchange rate, which reflects the “fundamentals.” In
the Asian emerging markets, however, “the more nebulous concept of ‘confidence’ dominated fundamentals” (Grenville 1998:13). Thus, leading Jeffrey Sachs

EAST ASIAN MODEL

335

(1998) of the Harvard Institute for Development to lament, “In a matter of just a
few months, the Asian economies went from being the darlings of the investment
community to being virtual pariahs. There was a touch of the absurd in the unfolding drama, as international money managers harshly castigated the very same
Asian governments they were praising just months before… But, as often happens
in financial markets, euphoria turned to panic without missing a beat. Suddenly,
Asia’s leaders could do no right. The money fled.”
III. Alternative Approaches to Economic Development2
Market vs. Central Planning
Before the rise of East Asia, two paradigms dominated development economics
literature: one focused on markets guided by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” as an
effective mechanism to promote economic growth, and the other on government
planning to ensure resources are mobilized and deployed in ways that promote
economic growth. The empirical tests of these opposing paradigms were to be
provided by the outcomes of the “developmental race” initiated in the 1950s
between India and China.
China and India, the two giants of Asia, entered the post-WW II era, sharing the world’s greatest development problems. Both represented the classic problem of an “underdeveloped area” with a huge population relative to land and other
resources; a predominantly agrarian society with masses of populations living in
extreme poverty. In 1950, the new governments of China and India led by Mao
Zedong and Jawaharal Nehru made explicit commitments to national planning for
economic modernization, to eradicate poverty and raise the standard of living for
the masses.
In their drive for economic development and modernization, both countries turned away from open-door strategies aimed at integrating their economies
into the world economy. The most important characteristics shared by both countries, namely, the abundance of people relative to other scarce resources such as
arable land, natural resources, and capital, suggested that the appropriate strategies for development would have involved production of labor-intensive goods,
some of which would be exchanged for imports of capital goods and technology
necessary for development. However, both countries turned away from export-oriented, outward-looking strategies, and from integration into the world economy.
Both China and India were opened up to the outside world by the force of
Western arms. Xenophobia and a suspicion of foreigners continued to remain
endemic in both countries even after their independence. Both China and India
turned toward autarky, and found the Soviet model of central planning resonant.
The resulting development strategy was import-substituting industrialization
based on the promotion of heavy industries. Both followed autarkic trade policies
with a barrage of trade and exchange controls, which effectively cut off any link
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between domestic and international markets. They also systematically discriminated against agriculture by taxing it directly or indirectly in order to finance
industrialization.
For China, the Soviet model of development and advice for its application
were at hand when the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949. Mao
Zedong did not have a settled national economic policy for reconstruction and
development. The outward-looking, market-oriented alternatives were simply
pushed beyond reach because of China’s engagement in the Korean War in 1950
and the ensuing Cold War between the two major powers, the Soviet Union and
the United States (Garnaut 1996). In India, a national planning commission established a comprehensive 5-year program to begin in 1951, “a plan that rapidly
acquired international status as an empirical model of accepted development theory” (Malenbaum 1982:46). The plan stipulated the new levels and channels for
national consumption, savings, and investment, and outlined new policies to
achieve these goals. Unlike the central planning under the Communistic Soviet
Union and China, India’s economic planning was to be carried out under a parliamentary democracy to assure individual freedoms and to retain the market system
for economic decision-making. In China, however, development policies and
plans were to be carried out by the centralized government controls of a Soviettype system. Under Mao Zedong, private ownership and control were replaced by
the centralized, authoritarian decision making of public authorities. By the time
China’s first 5-year development plan was implemented in 1952, nationalization
and land reform were already “blending into effective tools for resource mobilization and allocation” (Malenbaum 1982).
Thus, the early 1950s saw the beginning of “the developmental race”
between the two giants of Asia who shared similar development problems. Both
were similar in their size, historical background, and in their economic structure
and status (that is, extreme poverty among the masses of populations); also similar were their national goals and aspirations for raising living standards for the
masses of population through economic modernization and development. Both
countries were vastly different, however, in their ideologies: Communism in
China and British Fabian socialism in India; in their governmental institutions: a
totalitarian regime in China and a parliamentary democracy in India; and in their
approaches to implementing developmental policies and plans: a command system of centralized controls in China and the market system with “planning” in
social democratic thinking in India.
The race elicited wide interest on the part of government officials, scholars, and citizens everywhere. To many in the West, India’s economy was viewed
as “a democratic experiment in development and hence perceived as an alternative to China’s totalitarian path” (Bhagwati 1993: 6). The outcome of the race
would have some far reaching political implications: If China won, the totalitarian model of the Soviet Union and its ally China would have a profound impact on
the leadership of Third World developing countries, pushing them further into the
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Soviet bloc. Many, however, expected that India would emerge as the winner of
the race.3
Economic Performance
During the 1950s and 1960s, both economies seemed to perform well in mobilizing domestic resources for economic development. The “big push” argument for
development4 seemed to be working in reality, and their achievements demonstrated that it was possible to raise per capita income and living standards even in
these populous countries. Although a comparison of the relative economic performance of India and China had been hampered by statistical problems of estimating China’s national output and population, many researchers agreed that until
the 1970s China grew faster than India.
Central planning and bureaucratic regulation and protection may boost
economic growth rapidly in the early stages of development. They may be effective in mobilizing resources and channeling investment into new activities that are
artificially selected, protected, and promoted. However, bureaucratic regulation on
economic performance impact social and political processes that emerge gradually over time. For instance, controls will breed rent-seeking activities, stifling
efficiency in resource allocation, production, competition, and economic growth
in the long run.
The East Asian Miracle: Some Common Elements
By the 1970s, it had become clear that the winner of “the developmental race”
would be neither India nor China. The race ended altogether with different dark
horses when the (uninvited) four East Asian NIEs—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore—crossed the finish line first in the middle of the race in the
early 1980s. The broad interest in the race between the two giants of Asia was
soon lost, and the developmental strategies of these East Asian tigers soon became
the focus of universal attention. The economic achievements of the East Asian
NIEs are truly extraordinary and historic, and their success has been aptly referred
to as “the East Asian miracle.” This miraculous economic success was initiated
by Japan, which grew by 9 to 10 percent per year from the mid-1950s to the early
1970s. Following the footsteps of Japan, the four East Asian tigers started to grow
rapidly in the late 1970s. Export-oriented development strategies guided by the
government are believed to have provided the conditions for successful “takeoff ”
as suggested by Rostow (1960), especially in the case of Korea and Taiwan. Right
behind these four tigers were Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, which started to
grow rapidly in the mid-1980s, and they were soon followed by China. These
countries have shown double-digit growth rates in the 1990s. Some writers, like
Krugman, have contended that there is nothing “miraculous” about the East Asian
miracle,5 thereby opening up the total factor productivity debate. Nonetheless,
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hardly anyone contests the remarkable economic success of the four little tigers of
East Asia, who won “the developmental race” of the twentieth century, and the
second-tier NIEs of Southeast Asia.
The success of the East Asian economies and the collapse of the socialist
economies called into question the standard paradigms for development and their
intellectual foundations (Stiglitz 1996). The East Asian success story has raised
many important questions in development economics in theory as well as policy:
Why did some countries grow so rapidly, as much as 8 percent per year or more
continuously for more than two decades, while others (notably in South Asia,
Latin America, and Africa) failed? What did these East Asian countries (or
economies) do right? What are the common threads that led these economies to
successful takeoff? Can these successful development experiences be replicated in
other developing countries?
Despite numerous differences in history, culture, and economic and political institutions in most of the East Asian countries (economies) that are part of
the “East Asian miracle,” one factor stands out: That is, “government undertook
major responsibility for the promotion of economic growth” in these countries
(Stiglitz 1996:151). In addition, some of the common ingredients of economic
success are as follows: (1) These countries (economies) have all pursued exportoriented development strategies; (2) They have been successful in maintaining
high rates of saving and investment; (3) Emphasis has been placed on promoting
universal education and making enormous investments in human capital so as to
better absorb and adapt the most advanced technology; (4) For almost all of the
East Asian economies, with the exception of Hong Kong, industrial policies were
an important part of their growth strategies.
IV. The East Asian Model of Economic Development
A Single East Asian Experience or Model?
Because of the common ingredients of the East Asian miracle and the common
structural weaknesses shared by these economies that are believed to have contributed directly or indirectly to the East Asian crisis (as discussed previously in
Section II), a misconception has been created that there is a single East Asian
model of economic development. There is no such thing as a homogeneous East
Asian model of economic development or experience, however. Among the East
Asian countries, at least five categories of industrialization experience can easily
be identified: (1) The Japanese case of government-directed industrialization; (2)
South Korea and Taiwan, following closely the footsteps of Japan, with statedirected production and exports for the world market; (3) Two city-states of
Singapore and Hong Kong (now reverted back to China) with completely open
“free ports” to the outside world; (4) The second-tier NICs of Malaysia, Thailand,
and Indonesia with FDI-led exports and growth; (5) China, since 1978 and the
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leadership of Deng Xiao-ping, with its open-door policy for FDI and substantial
public expenditures on infrastructure development.
To be sure, there is no established and agreed upon definition of the East
Asian model of economic development.6 Compared to its Western counterpart,
however, the model as used by Japan, and later by South Korea and Taiwan, has
several distinguishing features. The most important one is that governments play
an important, proactive role in the process of industrialization and economic
development. Both South Korea and Taiwan can be characterized as what
Chalmers Johnson (1987) called the “developmental state,” in which the state recognizes economic development as the primary goal and does not hesitate to intervene in a market-oriented economy to achieve this goal. As a capitalist state, the
developmental state is committed to private property and the market system. The
government bureaucrats who formulate and implement strategic industrial policies to promote economic development, however, closely monitor the workings of
the market system. Both South Korea and Taiwan also promoted a bank-based
financial system under close government control. They also used international
trade as the primary means for economic growth and development. Among other
things, these commonalities shared by both South Korea and Taiwan help explain
the phenomenal economic success achieved in the past three decades.
Different Strategies for Development: South Korea and Taiwan
Although South Korea and Taiwan are the prime examples of the stylized East
Asian model of development, the approaches taken by these two countries in their
application of the model were different: a “big is beautiful” type of approach in
Korea, and a “small is beautiful” type of approach in Taiwan. In South Korea, economic policy was geared at achieving rapid economic growth whereas macroeconomic stability was given higher priority in Taiwan. Big business conglomerates,
known as the chaebol, emerged as the engine of growth dominating the South
Korean economy, while in Taiwan small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
played a central role in economic growth and development. The different outcomes of the 1997-98 crisis for South Korea and Taiwan may be attributable to
these differences in policies and approaches adopted by the two in their application of the East Asian model of development.7
In South Korea, the growth-first policy involved selecting some specific
sectors or business firms to nurture through the government-directed, discretionary policy of credit allocation and other measures. The financial institutions
were placed under government control, and they became simply a “silent partner”
in the process of economic development. In this process of credit allocation, SMEs
(small and medium sized enterprises) were given little or no consideration for
government support. In Taiwan, on the other hand, emphasis was placed on nurturing the spirit of individual entrepreneurship for SMEs. It is these SMEs who laid
a firm foundation for the sound financial system and industrial organization in the
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Taiwanese economy. In the case of South Korea, there is little doubt that the
growth-first strategy with “financial repression” under the government-controlled
financial system and the selection of prioritized industries to be developed
achieved the goal of rapid economic growth. But unfortunately, the strategy also
helped to create giant industrial conglomerates, the chaebol, which by the end of
the 1970s had already become “too big to fail,” and dominated the South Korean
economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, the state deviated from its status as a developmental state, and the chaebol became too big and powerful to control, eventually
pressuring the government to prematurely deregulate and liberalize financial markets. This greatly reduced the government’s ability to control and regulate international short-term capital flows, known as “hot money.” The government, rather
than directing and guiding business firms towards its developmental goals, began
to resemble an agent of the chaebol (P.H. Park 2000).
As in South Korea, Taiwan also followed the stylized East Asian model of
development, but emphasis was placed on economic growth with stability.
Accordingly, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime implemented economic policies
aimed at preventing inflation, financial instability and the concentration of private
capital. To maintain monetary stability, the government nationalized the banking
system and placed the entire financial sector under its control. As a result of this
tight regulation and control of the financial sector and the policy of avoiding
excessive concentration of private capital, Taiwanese firms had to rely on their
own funds, small loans from a number of banks, and money borrowed from relatives and friends. This reliance on traditional household networks for financing
has been largely responsible for shaping the Taiwanese industrial structure: First,
it has limited the size of business firms because there were no huge concessionary or special loans such as those made available under the growth-first strategy
in South Korea. Second, the debt-equity ratios for Taiwanese firms tended to be
much lower than those of the South Korean counterparts since banks were not
willing to lend large sums to individual firms, and they could only borrow so
much from the traditional household networks.
Taiwan’s anti-inflationary policy, along with a high-interest-rate policy,
was successful in boosting capital accumulation and growth. Unlike South Korea,
Taiwan did not have to depend heavily on foreign borrowing to finance domestic
investment. In fact, during the period 1971-1994, Taiwan was able to finance its
entire gross domestic capital formation out of internally generated domestic savings (P.H. Park 2000:160, table 7.6). This, of course, greatly reduced its vulnerability to foreign debts and external shocks. While South Korea relied heavily on
foreign borrowing and blocked foreign direct investment (FDI), Taiwan opened its
door to FDI. Inward FDI into Taiwan not only contributed to capital formation, but
also served as an important vehicle for technology transfer (Chowdhury and Islam
1997).
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V. East Asia’s Varying Development Strategies and Experiences
There are studies that recognize significant differences among the East Asian
economies. The World Bank’s miracle study (World Bank 1993), for instance, proposes at least two types of models of East Asian development, one based on the
Japanese paradigm of industrial policy and more active state intervention as followed closely by both Korea and Taiwan, and the other on the more open and market-friendly regimes of Southeast Asia. Similarly, another study by Terry (1996)
stresses the dichotomy between the development experiences of Northeast Asia
and Southeast Asia. Recognizing the dichotomies acknowledged by these studies,
we examine some of the differences in development strategies chosen by the East
Asian economies. Where possible, we will try to discern some similarities across
the economies in Northeast Asia and those in Southeast Asia. In particular, the
similarities and differences will be noted in the following aspects in the process
of industrialization: (1) the role of government in general; (2) industrial policy in
particular; (3) attitudes and policies towards FDI and technology transfer; and (4)
incentives and policies for export-led growth.
The Role of Government
Some argue that the Asian crisis has demonstrated a limited life for the interventionist model for economic development. The model worked out successfully for
Japan and East Asian countries, including South Korea and Taiwan, while the following conditions prevailed: First, countries must have a high household savings
rate; there must be a political consensus that the benefits of financial repression
(favored firms receiving low-cost loans) exceed the costs to consumers or those
investors who must use informal or curb capital market; there must be rapid
increases in GDP, both to build political support for the intervention and to mask
its inefficiencies; countries must run trade surpluses in order to build foreign
exchange reserves; and finally, countries should be in the early stages of economic
expansion, when capital accumulation matters more to growth than technological
progress. Once economic growth begins to slow down because of accumulating
inefficiencies and a diminishing marginal product for capital, the inefficiencies
would become harder to hide, investor optimism would begin to fall, and political
support would erode. The interventionist model for development of the East Asian
type carries with it the seeds of its own destruction, and world integration makes
it less viable in the long run (Cargill and Parker 1999).
However, one must keep in mind that a premature relaxation of intervention by the state may bring a disaster. One important contributing factor to the
Asian crisis is not “too much of state intervention” but rather “lack of it.” As in
Korea, for instance, “the crisis stemmed from the uncontrolled debt-financed
expansion of the chaebols. The government’s abdication, in the face of chaebol
power, of activist state coordination of private-sector investment and its relaxation
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of controls over the private sector’s foreign borrowing were the key factors that
precipitated the crisis” (Bello 1999). In several of the Asian crisis countries, badly
managed financial liberalization lifted restrictions on bank borrowing and lending
before putting in place a sound regulatory framework. Many of the problems arose
not because governments did too much, but because they did too little, and
because “they themselves had deviated from the policies that had proved so successful over preceding decades” (Stiglitz 1998). In South Korea, as the chaebol
became too big to fail and their power increased, the state’s power eroded and,
unfortunately in the 1980s and 1990s, the state “evolved in such a way that it came
to resemble a racketeering state rather than a developmental one” (P.H. Park
2000:62). In Taiwan, however, unlike in the case of South Korea, the government
never lost its autonomy even after significant measures of liberalization were
introduced in the financial and industrial sectors. The state was able to remain a
developmental state, still occupying the “commanding heights” in the Taiwanese
economy.
At least two lessons can be drawn from the South Korean and Taiwanese
experiences with economic development. One, economic stability cannot be sacrificed for rapid economic growth. Two, a strong government with an economic
bureaucracy that is highly capable but still independent of the business community is an essential institutional prerequisite for successful policy formulation and
implementation (Evans 1998). For instance, the Taiwanese government never lost
its autonomy, and remained a developmental state, maintaining its “commanding
heights” in the economy. This is in contrast to South Korea where the powerful
chaebol wielded a strong influence over government policy; Taiwanese firms were
not allowed to consolidate their economic power, and they were constrained to
conduct their financial and industrial operations in a highly flexible, widely diversified manner. It was these small-scale, flexible, and informal household network
groups in Taiwan that became highly instrumental in easing the adaptation of the
economy to changing circumstances and external shocks (Wang 1998).
Industrial Policy
Compared to static comparative advantage, dynamic comparative advantage
refers to the creation of comparative advantage through the mobilization of skilled
labor, technology, and capital. Either the private or public sector of the economy
can create such an advantage. When governments attempt to create comparative
advantage, the term industrial policy is used. Industrial policy thus seeks to
encourage the development of emerging, sunrise industries through various government measures such as tax incentives, R&D subsidies, credit allocation, and
protection against foreign imports. It is an attempt by the government to influence
the industrial structure of the economy and the allocation of resources between
different industries. Simply put, industrial policy refers to government actively
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intervening in the economy and selecting some specific industries to protect and
nurture.
Almost all of the economies in East Asia had industrial policies, suggesting that such policies were an integral part of their development strategies.
However, it is known that the governments of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan pursued
more active industrial policies than their Southeast Asian counterparts. In other
words, the Southeast Asian economies relied more on market forces in determining winners and losers among industries.
The early Japanese industrial policy was targeted at those industries with
income-elastic demands in the international market and with substantial largescale economies. The industries selected for nurturing included steel, automobile,
textiles, shipbuilding, and, in later years, the electronics and semiconductor industries. The government directed credit towards large business firms in these industries, and domestic markets for these industries were heavily protected against foreign competition to help firms realize large-scale economies.8 As in Japan, the
government of Korea also used credit allocation and protection from foreign
imports to nurture targeted industries. Unlike in Japan, however, the Korean government promoted specific individual business firms more actively to cope with
perceived deficiencies in entrepreneurial role and skill. These policies were
directly responsible for creating large business conglomerates, known as chaebol,
which dominated the Korean economy. The big losers were, of course, SMEs.9
In 1969, the government of Malaysia formulated the New Economic
Policy (NEP), which was designed to redistribute the wealth and economic activities from non-Malays to Malays. As part of this NEP, the government targeted
heavy industries mainly because the Chinese dominated the light industries. A
state-owned holding company, called Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia
(HICOM) was established to manage various projects in heavy industries through
joint ventures with foreign partners. HICOM projects included the Proton Saga
(the national car), an M$1.2 billion iron and steel plant, and a number of energyrefining and utility projects (Brown 1994). The anticipated economic “takeoff ”
based on state-led, “big-push” industrialization efforts did not materialize simply
because both internal and external economic conditions were not favorable.
Almost all units under HICOM went into the red. As a result, the management of
state industries was turned over to private sector managers in 1988, who were
mostly non-Malays. This (courageous) change in management signaled a change
in government industrial policy—away from the earlier efforts at state-led industrialization toward more emphasis on market signals and the profit criteria for
evaluating state enterprise performance, and at the same time privatization and
denationalization of industries have gained momentum in Malaysia (Bowie 1994).
As in Malaysia, Indonesia also made serious attempts at state-led industrialization. In particular, efforts were made to emulate Korea’s chaebol-led development of heavy industries. A group of bureaucrats known as “technologists,”
who pushed for large-scale, high-tech investment projects, became influential.
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Indonesia’s industrial policy, however, has not been successful mainly because the
state’s capacity for effective intervention was hampered by bureaucratic weakness
and incapability. Consequently, “selective intervention on Korean lines could not
work in countries like Indonesia because of weaker administrative and institutional structures, less clear economic objectives and skill limitation” (World Bank
1993:170).
Industrial policies as used by the East Asian economies have been widely criticized on several grounds. One serious charge is that even though there is a
rationale for government intervention (presence of market failures), government
simply does not do a good job in picking winners, that is, industrial policy is distortionary. According to Joseph Stiglitz (1996), such criticism is either exaggerated or misguided: Good decision-making by the government necessarily involves
making mistakes; the government was not heavy-handed; virtually all governments in East Asia decided to support export-oriented industries, which was
essentially choosing a winning development strategy, rather than simply picking
winners in the narrow sense of the term. Most important of all, through their
industrial policies, East Asian governments have performed an entrepreneurial
role: “Entrepreneurship requires combining technological and marketing knowledge, a vision of the future, a willingness to take risks, and an ability to raise capital. In early stages of development, these ingredients are typically in short supply. The governments in East Asia stepped in to fill the gap—but in a way that promoted rather than thwarted the development of private entrepreneurship” (Stiglitz
1996:162).
Policies towards FDI and Technology Transfer
FDI has not been a significant factor in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, although it
played a much larger role in Hong Kong and particularly in Singapore. For all second-tier NIEs of ASEAN, however, FDI has been much more important than for
countries in Northeast Asia.
In both Japan and Korea, the governments adopted policies to restrict
foreign ownership by imposing ceilings for foreign ownership in specific industries and by providing various fiscal incentives for joint ventures rather than full
foreign ownership. Such restrictive policies grew out of their concern about
control of domestic industries by foreigners, which may pose difficulties in implementing development strategies, and their concern about developing indigenous
firms. At the same time, however, the transfer and adaptation of foreign technology was recognized as a critical link in the process of industrial development.
While restricting both FDI and foreign ownership, the Korean government emphasized the promotion of absorptive capacity and indigenization of foreign technology through reverse engineering. Formal R&D was not that important when
imitative reverse engineering was successfully carried out. Korean firms were
able to assimilate import-embodied technology so rapidly that they were able to
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undertake subsequent expansion in production, and upgrade the industrial structure as well (Ahn 2001).
Compared to the Northeast Asian countries, the Southeast Asian countries, in general, have been more open and receptive to FDI and other foreign capital. Singapore had few restrictions and regulations governing FDI and MNCs. In
fact, one of the major tasks of the Economic Development Board (EDB), a
Singaporean government agency, was to scout for foreign investors. Malaysia,
adopting the “Look East” policy in 1981 to emulate the industrial deepening
efforts of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, also actively sought FDI, especially from
Japan. FDI has played a central role in the emergence and success of export-oriented manufacturing sectors in Malaysia, especially in electronics (Athkorala and
Menon 1995). Traditionally, Thailand has maintained a liberal attitude towards
FDI. The promotion of FDI has been a major element in every national development plan since 1960. As in Malaysia, the government of Thailand has placed the
highest priority on FDI-led, export-oriented industrial development. FDI from
Japan has played a significant role in developing and upgrading the automobile
and electronics sectors of the Thai economy (Yoshida 1992).
Incentives and Policies for Export-Led Growth
Despite substantial differences in factor endowments and initial economic conditions, virtually all of the East Asian countries have pursued export-oriented policies for their industrial development. In terms of the old idea of economic takeoff
(Rostow 1960), export growth in these countries provided fuel for takeoff for
industrialization. This export-led industrialization was led by Japan, and followed
by other groups of East Asian countries one after another, like a group of geese
flying in V-formation. This metaphor for economic development has been known
as the “flying geese” hypothesis (Akamatsu 1961), popular among academicians
in Asia, particularly in Japan.10
Difference in resource endowments played a key role in determining
when and how the East Asian economies shifted from import substitution to
export promotion in their development strategies. For the economies of Northeast
Asia, the paucity of natural resources was an important factor responsible for their
rapid shift to manufactured exports, which required industrial upgrading through
more active and selective industrial policies by their governments. In contrast, for
the Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, the rich natural resource base gave rise to agro-based leading sectors for economic development, “which could become competitive on world markets with a more modest
initial role for the government and less dependence on imported inputs” (Akyuz,
Chang, and Kozul-Wright 1998:18). Because of rich natural resource endowments, these countries were able to pursue industrialization based on import substitution for a longer period than the countries of Northeast Asia, but limits on the
growth potential through import substitution became apparent in the 1970s and
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early 1980s.
In their policy reforms involving a switch towards export-oriented industrial development, these Southeast Asian countries were willing to allow FDI to
play a key role in compensating for “the absence of local entrepreneurial and
organizational skills, capital, technological capacity and international marketing
networks” (Akyuz et al. 1998:20). As mentioned earlier, the “Look East” policy
was undertaken in Malaysia to emulate the industrial upgrading policies of Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan. More liberal foreign investment laws were introduced, and
their implementation accelerated in the 1980s. The timing of this shift in policy
coincided with a sharp shift in the competitive position of business firms of Japan
and the first-tier NIEs of Northeast Asia, thereby allowing the second-tier NIEs to
take over comparative advantage in such manufactured exports as electronics.
As in the economies of Northeast Asia, however, labor-intensive, exportoriented manufacturing industries in Southeast Asia did not develop spontaneously through the availability of cheap labor and greater reliance on freer trade
and FDI for the transfer of technology and managerial skills. In addition to the
provision of infrastructure and universal education, various government measures
have been used to accelerate investment in these industries. These measures
include subsidies, tax breaks, support for training programs, and various export
promotion measures, which are simply part of an industrial policy to create
dynamic comparative advantages.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The East Asian economies were similar in many respects: high rates of savings
and investment, export-led industrialization, macroeconomic stability, investment
in physical and human capital, and willingness to absorb foreign technology.
These shared characteristics enabled their miraculous economic success. At the
same time, they also shared a number of structural weaknesses in their economies,
including weak and inefficient financial systems, lack of corporate transparency
and accountability, close relationships between government and business, and
widespread corruption. Such common weaknesses are believed to have played a
role in precipitating the Asian financial crisis.
These common strengths and weaknesses helped to reinforce the misconception that there is a single East Asian model of economic development. There
are, however, significant differences in economic structures and the development
experiences among the East Asian economies, especially between the economic
development paradigms of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. Even for the two
prime examples of the stylized East Asian model such as South Korea and Taiwan,
development strategies and experiences were vastly different. A deeper and wellbalanced understanding of East Asia’s economic success and its “downfall”
requires a better understanding of the differences and the similarities as well. The
structural differences and differences in development paths among the economies
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of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia suggest that it is altogether inappropriate to
presume the existence of a single East Asian model of economic development.
There is, however, one single common thread underlying the differences
with development strategy and experience among the East Asian economies: the
role of the government. The governments of East Asia “undertook major responsibility for the promotion of economic growth,” they recognized the limitations of
markets (or market failures) in the allocation of scarce resources in the economy,
and used government interventions to promote economic development.
Government interventions were used to pick winners in the manufacturing sector,
to promote cooperation and competition among firms, and to lead export-led
industrialization. Rather than replacing markets, “these governments promoted
and used them” (Stiglitz 1996: 156).
Among a large number of causes of the Asian financial crisis discussed
in the literature, there is one influence that is often overlooked: rapidly increasing
globalization of business activities and markets in the world economy. The East
Asian countries (and all other countries as well) have been simply too slow to fully
appreciate the new challenges and risks posed by the rapidly globalizing financial
markets. Consequently, they have been too slow in formulating appropriate
responses and policies. Globalization has increased the speed and magnitude of
market reactions. It has magnified the costs of bad, inconsistent policies and
weak, inefficient institutions. In today’s global environment, the forces of globalization are simply beyond one’s control. In short, Pacific Asian countries have
simply fell victim to globalization.11
Globalization, if properly managed, may help push some developing
countries into modernity and affluence. But as the Asian financial crisis suggests,
embracing global financial markets can also be highly dangerous and costly. The
Asian crisis has shown how important it is to have effective state institutions that
are capable of successfully mediating the impact of globalization on economic
development. Therefore, “heightened exposure to world markets will only become
a true lever of economic development in the presence of institutions able to mitigate market failures and manage the competitive challenges and domestic dislocations produced by openness” (Heredia 1997:384). Exceedingly drastic measures of liberalization and opening up may weaken the existing relation-based governance structure of the economy before a new and more rule-based governance
mechanism could function. Korea and Thailand may be a case in point. In the
early 1990s, financial liberalization as well as political liberalization in these
countries proceeded, perhaps too fast and too early, before an effective rule-based
governance structure was put in place. In short, “the dismantling of too many
existing relation-based mechanisms in so short a period can damage the future
potential of economies at an early stage of development to continue to catch up”
(Li 1999:28).
The recent Asian crisis hardly signifies the end of the East Asian model
of economic development. For many Third World developing countries, the
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relation-based East Asian model of economic development, if properly adopted
and executed, as in the case of Taiwan, can be effective in facilitating a “catchingup” in the early stage of economic growth and development. In the wake of the
Asian crisis, the credence of the model has been seriously questioned, but the
model itself is not in crisis. It is the strategy or approach to be used in its application that must be carefully weighted and evaluated for individual countries.
NOTES
1

Unless otherwise specified, East Asia is broadly defined in this paper to include
the whole region of both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, including (1) Japan,
(2) the first-tier NIEs of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, (3) the
second-tier NIEs of Malyasia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and other
emerging markets of ASEAN, and (4) China. This section draws heavily on: J.H.
Park (2002b).

2

Discussion in this section draws heavily on: J.H. Park (2002a).

3

In fact, the early writings of the leading development economists such as Walter
Rostow, Max Milliken, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Wilfred Malenbaum, and George
Rosen, were all optimistic and well disposed toward India’s economic planning
and methods.

4

According to the doctrine of the “big push,” a government should put in place all
the measures for development at the same time, such as mobilizing domestic
resources and channeling those resources into large-scale physical investments in
infrastructure, basic industry, and research and development; developing legal
and institutional changes, etc.

5

See Krugman (1994). For a rebuttal, see Radelet and Sachs (1997). Also, for a
succinct summary of why we continue to have ample grounds to view the East
Asian growth as “miraculous,” see Barro (1998).

6

See, for instance, Adams and James (1999); Akyuz (1999); and Berger (1988).

7

For an excellent comparative study of the South Korean and Taiwanese
experiences of economic development, see: P.H. Park (2000).

8

For a comprehensive review of the Japanese experience with industrial policy,
see Woronoff (1982) and Johnson (1982).

9

For more comprehensive discussions of the Korean experience with industrial
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policy, see Leipziger (1993) and Amsden (1989).
10

Japan, flying in front, is flanked by Hong Kong and Singapore and followed by
South Korea and Taiwan. Behind South Korea and Taiwan are Malaysia and
Thailand and then Indonesia and the Philippines. The order of these East Asian
countries (economies) reflects each economy’s stage of industrialization and
level of per capita income. In terms of export-led industrialization, Japan long
ago moved from textiles to steel and chemical industries, turning over its status
of major textile exporter to Hong Kong. As Japan moved from steel and ship
building to automobiles and electronics, Korea took over in steel and
shipbuilding. Dynamic comparative advantage forces forerunners to vacate the
markets for less sophisticated manufactured goods, allowing latecomers to take
over those markets. See Ito (1997).

11

No country is immune from a potential currency crisis. No country would be safe
if faced with a massive international capital outflow such as the one that took
place in Southeast and East Asia in 1997. As discussed earlier in this paper, in
1996, there was a record capital inflow of $93 billion into Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, followed by a net outflow of capital
of $12 billion in the following year 1997. This reversal of private capital flows of
$105 billion was equivalent to 11 percent of the combined GDP of these five
Asian countries. In terms of the U.S. economy, this would be equivalent to a
change in capital flows of over $940 billion, which would no doubt wreak havoc
on the U.S. financial markets!
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